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Abstract: This paper examines the legal and policy implications of information asymmetry 
on foreign domestic workers employed under the Kafala sponsorship system in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Drawing from ethnographic and field-based 
observations in large GCC migrant destinations—including Kuwait, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE)—we investigate the flow of information and market uncertainties 
between five key stakeholders: labor-receiving government, labor-sending government, 
recruitment agencies (subagents), sponsors (employers), and social networks.  Several factors 
contribute to asymmetric information: the lack of bilateral labor agreements and government 
policy coordination, programs between and among government entities, the absence of labor 
law for domestic workers, and the laissez faire approach of the labor-receiving government.  
These sources of asymmetric information do not only create serious market vulnerabilities for 
the domestic worker population, but often lead to loss of employment and early deportation. 
The concluding section further outlines various critical policy implications and potential 





“When I came to the UAE, I thought I would work as a beauty manicurist. But 
when I arrived here, my recruitment agency pushed me to work as a domestic 
worker.  I did not have training, but I had to do it. I borrowed US $2,000 in 
order to come to the UAE, and now I am in debt before I even start my job”—
Martina, 28, a Filipina runaway domestic worker in Qatar1 
“One of the main challenges we face is the lack of coordination between 
sending and receiving countries. There is lack of procedure for addressing 
domestic workers’ rights. There is no labor law and this puts us in a tricky, 
unregulated labor market, where labor violations are high.” – Country official 
in Kuwait 
In the Middle East, domestic work migration has increasingly become one of the most 
important policy discourses.2 In particular, among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries, temporary labor migrants—mostly from Asian and Arab countries—constituted 40 
percent of the total population (18 million out of 41 million) in 2010 (Fargues and Shah, 
2014).  Domestic workers account for more than 2.5 million of the foreign labor (almost 15 
percent) (International Labor Organization (ILO), 2012). Domestic workers, who mainly 
come from the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Nepal, are employed under the GCC 
countries’ Kafala sponsorship system. Various international human rights organizations—
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—have strongly criticized the GCC 
countries’ failure to regulate the domestic work sector, highlighting various labor rights 
violations, including but not limited to non-payment, long hours of work, squalid 
accommodation, weak access to judicial systems, and even physical abuse (HRW 2010, 
2011, 2013).  
Similar to other female domestic workers in the Middle East, Martina’s need to travel 
for financial reasons indirectly indicates that domestic workers are motivated by home 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this study, the participants’ actual names were altered to protect and maintain their 
confidentiality and anonymity.  
2 Moors et al (2009) links the rapid growth in paid domestic labor to the feminization of international migration 
along with income inequality and family composition.  
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country factors and/or destination country factors (Massey et al, 1993), whereby a rational 
economic agent follows a cost-benefit analysis when determining migration decisions. The 
costs include the actual moving expenses and other indirect non-monetary costs. Benefits also 
have monetary and non-monetary aspects. Both literatures on Neoclassical and the new 
economics of migration (NEM) suggest that, to a large extent, the expected wage differential 
between the destination and home countries trigger migration. Unexpected shocks in the 
destination country introduce risk factors that affect the expected wage and ultimately the 
migration experience. Shocks include macro-shocks, exogenous to the migrant, and micro-
shocks, which are endogenous and directly linked to the migrant (i.e. committing a crime). 
Although macro-shocks, such as bad economic conditions, are largely out of the migrant’s 
capacity, their effects on temporary labor migrants are often direct. On the other hand, micro-
shocks are related to the migrant. Both types of shocks can lead to loss of employment and 
subsequently loss of expected earnings. In either case, at the heart of the labor migration 
dilemma is keeping a job at the destination despite any shock. In the case of the GCC 
countries, unexpected shocks to migrants are even more costly because they include loss of 
income (loss of employment) and could lead to an early return to their home countries.3 In 
traditional migration destinations such as North America and Europe, migrants have a path to 
permanent residency and citizenship; therefore, the loss of employment does not necessarily 
impede their right to stay.   
This paper examines the legal and policy implications of asymmetric information 
under the GCC’s Kafala sponsorship system, focusing on domestic workers from the 
Philippines. A domestic worker is typically a female employee working in or for a household 
                                                 
3Once they are made redundant, migrants have 30 days to find a job before they must leave. In instances of 
criminal activity (in Kuwait, this could be as simple as a speeding ticket), repatriation is done by deportation, 
which is typically followed by a lifetime ban on the migrant. A ban on the migrant permanently shuts down the 
work destination and a lucrative source of income.  
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of the sponsor/employer.4 While various human rights studies have proliferated in the 
domestic work migration discourse of the GCC, no studies have examined how asymmetric 
information inherently generates economic micro-shocks and, in many instances, early 
repatriation of domestic workers living in the GCC. Selected case studies from Kuwait, 
Qatar, and the UAE are presented to explore this growing phenomenon. This particular study 
is therefore critically relevant because, with the expected continuous growth in the local 
economies, GCC countries will inevitably demand higher number of domestic workers to 
address manpower shortages in various households or hospitality sectors in the GCC. 
This paper is divided into four main sections. The first section briefly reviews the 
literature on asymmetric information and labor migration, highlighting various empirical 
limitations. The second section examines the GCC-wide Kafala sponsorship system and 
explains the role of asymmetric information in the domestic labor market. The third section 
examines various key factors that contribute to asymmetric information, while explaining 
legal and policy gaps in the existing literature. The final section investigates policy 
implications.  
 
Literature Review  
Any situation in which the first party has more or better information than the second suggests 
the existence of asymmetry in information. Under these circumstances, the market 
equilibrium is not optimal. The initial application of asymmetric information was developed 
in the used-car market, but it has been widely studied since then (Akerlof, 1970). In 
particular, asymmetric information between employers (or sponsors) and migrants has direct 
economic implications on the labor market. As Katz and Stark (1987: 718) acknowledges, the 
                                                 
4 Under the Domestic Work Convention (2011), a domestic worker is an individual who performs in or for a 
household or households. It also means “any person engaged in domestic work and employment relationship.” 
However, a person performs domestic work occasionally and not on an occupational basis is not considered an 
official domestic worker.  
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“most natural application of the asymmetry information lies where (at least initially) 
employers do not know the productivity level of individual employees.” Asymmetric 
information can also occur when market “information does not ordinarily flow across them or 
does not flow costlessly and freely” within the labor market. While some literature has 
examined the effect of asymmetric information on international migration (Katz and Stark 
1984, 1987) and consequences on transnational households and remittances (Chen, 2006; De 
Laat, 2008; Ashraf, 2011; Chin, 2011; Seshan, 2012; Ambler, 2012), no studies have directly 
analyzed the impact of asymmetric information (particularly in economic, legal, and social 
aspects) on migrants’ income and employment status (i.e. wages, working conditions) within 
the host-country labor market. 
Asymmetric information poses unintended direct costs and risks before and after the 
migration process. It often becomes more prevalent when labor mobility between different 
countries is considered in conjunction with the source country’s languages, systems, 
institutions, and cultures, because they differ widely from the destination country (Kar, 
2009). A policy study by the National Planning Commission in Nepal, for example, found 
that Nepalese workers pay recruitment US $1,200 to secure job placement in Qatar, despite 
the Qatari government’s prohibition of unauthorized placement fees (International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). The lack of public awareness, exacerbated by the 
unequal flow of information incurs additional and, in many cases, relatively significant 
income shocks for migrants. Similarly, in a field study of Filipino migrant workers in the 
UAE, Agunias (2012) concluded that, although Filipino migrants are often aware of the 
migration risks involved (paying around 10-30% of their monthly salary for the first three 
months to the recruitment agency), they do not often problematize recruitment agencies 
unauthorized placement fee policies, including those of their subagents and brokers. On the 
contrary, many Filipino workers, unaware that these placement fees are illegal, find this 
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practice “acceptable”. Amongst all immigrant workers, domestic workers were particularly 
likely to find the policies acceptable. The case of Filipino domestic workers, for example, not 
only shifts the financial burden/costs to migrants, but also poses direct negative effects on 
their earnings (and consequently remitting power) and potentially even on their employment 
status in the host country (for instance, by absconding in the hope of finding a better paying 
job).  
Other studies emphasize the risks perpetuated by recruitment agencies in creating 
uneven levels of information in the labor market. One example of this inequity is the 
recruitment agencies’ contract substitution practices, which directly contribute to serious 
income shocks on migrant’s earnings, oftentimes resulting in employment withdrawal.  
Battistella and Asis (2009) found that legal and illegal recruitment agencies in sending and 
receiving countries often deliberately practice ‘contract substitution’ to circumvent 
government regulations, frequently falsifying market information (i.e. wages, working 
conditions, employer’s background) to lure potential migrants to move. Such findings also 
reflect Agunias’s (2010) conclusions, which indicate that migrants are often tempted by high-
compensation packages stipulated within the government-mandated contracts before pre-
departure, which become invalid in the host country after the costly move. Furthermore, the 
ongoing labor exploitation and abuses perpetrated by agents in both origin and destination 
countries tend to increase recruitment costs, which is particularly shifted to “the weakest 
chain in the link: the migrant worker” (Agunias, 2012: 7). This uneven level of information, 
often regulated by recruitment agencies and their brokers, not only creates negative income 
shocks for migrants but also reinforces market vulnerabilities in the host country.5 
                                                 
5 Jureidini (2014) argues that the created vulnerabilities from such practices give rise to serious human rights 
offenses such as forced labor and human trafficking. 
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In addition to economic hardships, asymmetric information produces legal market 
vulnerabilities that also eventually shift economic costs onto migrants in the host country. 
Shuck (2007) emphasizes that “law defines individuals’ rights to property and economic 
activity […] and the content and configuration of these extra-immigration rights help to 
structure the set of opportunities that people can exploit.” Halabi (2008) finds that migrants 
are at a market disadvantage due to the mismatch between their knowledge of migrant-related 
rights and the knowledge of their recruitment agencies. Migrants are dependent on the Kafala 
sponsorship system, producing large disparities in the power balance between sponsors and 
migrants in which the former have full autonomy to exercise control (i.e. deportation or 
breach of contract). The disproportion in the power balance in the household of employment 
not only impacts the domestic workers’ employment security/stability and income but also 
poses critical challenges to immigration and residency status of migrants within the host 
country. 
Due to these economic and legal challenges, other scholars also examine migrants’ 
coping mechanisms. Chris (2007) notes in his fieldwork in the UAE that, despite the wealth 
of information made available by the official Philippines state and non-state institutions’ (i.e. 
NGO information, websites), many Filipino migrants often do not utilize these sources, 
placing them at a disadvantage in the labor market. However, Filipino migrant workers often 
effectively utilize informal social networks (i.e. friends, family members) to accumulate local 
knowledge and information, particularly about employment and other socio-legal information 
about the host-country labor market. Unfortunately, this information is commonly the result 
of real-life experiences endured by a migrant worker, frequently with a negative outcome. A 
migrant’s specific experience does not necessarily apply to others.  
To further explore the connections between asymmetric information and economic 
shocks in the host country, various semi-structured qualitative interviews with domestic 
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workers, government officials, and recruitment agencies were employed. Direct participation 
in key official meetings and conferences were also integrated to further validate various 
factors that produce asymmetric information under the GCC’s Kafala sponsorship system. 
The data collection process was executed in three different phases - Phase I (June – August 
2012), Phase II (November – January 2013), and Phase III (April – May 2014) – in select 
GCC countries, including Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.6  Approximately 70 domestic workers 
and officials participated in the interviews, of which 60 domestic workers responded. At least 
75% of interviewed domestic workers had a high-school education, while only 5% reported a 
college education. The average age was 29, and 82% of the interviewed domestic workers 
had at least one child. In the qualitative interviews, key factors, including demographic 
background, labor market experiences, and legal issues in the destination country, were 
captured. Interviews with labor-sending and receiving countries further validated various key 
factors that directly produce asymmetric information under the GCC’s Kafala sponsorship 
system. The next section briefly discusses the Kafala system and domestic work regulations. 
 
The GCC’s Kafala Sponsorship System and Domestic Work Regulations 
The Kafala sponsorship system is a government policy used to organize, manage, and control 
temporary labor migrant population in GCC countries. Kafala requires all temporary labor 
migrants to have an official local sponsor responsible for their immigration visa and 
residency status in the country (Gardner 2010). The Kafala sponsorship system is directly 
tied to the domestic work regulations, whereby the GCC governments often regulate 
domestic work-specific regulations.  For example, under the standardized contract agreement, 
domestic workers are legally required to work for two years and are often put on a three-
month probation period with their respective employer. Within the probation period, 
                                                 
6 The data collection was part of a wider project that also included a quantitative section. This study focuses on 
the qualitative aspect of the data.  
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domestic help can be returned to the agency at no cost to the employer (if the prospective 
employer is not satisfied or if his/her preferences change) and can potentially become a re-
hire by other employers to mitigate the agency’s transportation and other immigration-related 
costs. Outside the probationary period, domestic workers are often sent to the sending 
country’s embassy. The employer will not be able to receive any reimbursement due to the 
expiration of the contractual probationary period. This particular short-term probationary 
period not only poses critical economic issues between parties but also often becomes the 
source of moral hazard. As one Filipino official, Rodrigo notes: “…employers and 
recruitment agencies want to control costs so they often seek reimbursement from domestic 
workers, or deduct from their salary in order to protect themselves [...].”  It is also important 
to note here that the probationary period makes it difficult for domestic workers to 
understand regulations of domestic workers, given the common “no-day off policy” within 
private households. Further, domestic workers typically have no access to information from 
other sources (workshops, web, social interaction, etc.).7 Therefore, the combination of short-
term and unregulated structure of the probationary period with the limited access of domestic 
workers to the outside world works to disrupt the flow of information to the migrant, 
generating morally hazardous behavior by both the recruiting agency and the sponsor 
(employer). The next section examines the sources of information asymmetry within the 





                                                 
7 In such a short period of time, migrants have little opportunity to network with others for information. 
Therefore, the only source of information comes from a migrant’s connections (if they exist) before the current 
job.  
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Triggers of Asymmetric Information under the GCC’s Kafala Sponsorship System 
Factors Contributing to Asymmetric Information 
Drawing from our qualitative interviews with authorities from origin and destination 
governments, three key factors appear to contribute to asymmetric information under the 
GCC’s Kafala sponsorship system.  
Lack of bilateral agreement between countries 
Bilateral agreements can play a critical role in mitigating the effects of asymmetric 
information. Go (2005) argues that bilateral agreements set the parameters in determining the 
quotas, rights, and welfare of temporary labor migrants like domestic workers between origin 
and destination countries. The critical challenge is that destination countries often avoid 
entering into an agreement with sending countries due to perceived fear of political intrusion 
on their policymaking. As one origin-country official from the Philippines Patricia asserts, 
“Bilateral labor agreements are relevant, yet some GCC countries have been reluctant so far 
to enter into an agreement.8 These instruments can set a ‘guiding framework’ on how to 
effectively address labor rights related issues, or examine contract verification systems to 
monitor recruitment agencies’ malpractices in the long-run.” On the other hand, one could 
also argue that the GCC countries have no incentives to engage in bilateral talks with labor 
sending countries. The GCC countries currently have immense bargaining power due to the 
infinite supply of low-cost labor from neighboring Arab countries, South Asian countries and 
even from Western countries. Arab countries are suffering from perpetual instability and 
conflict, South Asian countries are struggling with large populations and weak economic 
performance, and Western countries are still experiencing the effects of the last economic 
crisis. The lack of bilateral agreement has not only developed a divergent and often 
incoherent policymaking process for domestic workers, but also has allowed various 
                                                 
8 In fact, Fernandez (2014) argues that the GCC countries are even reluctant to implement existing international 
treaties specific to domestic workers.  
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recruitment agencies the power to influence the dissemination of information to domestic 
workers. 
Lack of national labor laws 
Under most GCC national labor laws, domestic workers are generally excluded from 
accessing various government services, including mediation, arbitration, or conciliation 
within relevant ministries (Malit and Ghafoor 2014). Although domestic workers have a 
standard employment contract—mainly stipulating their wages, working conditions etc.—
they often have either limited or no protective mechanisms that could protect them from 
recruitment agencies. As one Filipino official, Carlos noted, “Standard employment contracts 
are legally difficult to enforce because there is no permanent law that is backing it. Therefore, 
employers and, to an extent, domestic workers can violate this standard labor contract 
without equal protection.” The lack of legal protection appears to contribute to asymmetric 
information partly because the unregulated nature of the industry (i.e. lack of monitoring of 
recruitment agencies’ malpractices and receiving countries’ small number of labor 
inspectors) provides a favorable legal environment for recruitment agencies to violate both 
the standardized labor contract and national labor laws in the destination country. 
Limited coordination between states 
The limited coordination between origin and destination countries further contributes to a 
weak legal framework of the domestic-work industry in the Gulf region. As one GCC labor 
official, Ahmed noted, “There is a weak cooperation between sending and receiving 
countries, but it is the responsibility of the sending countries to verify, regulate, and monitor 
domestic workers who come into this region. They need to be trained properly about our 
culture and relevant laws to address labor issues.” This particular issue reflects not only the 
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incoherent regulatory framework of both origin and destination countries, but also their 
limited efforts to systematically eradicate the existing differences in information.9 
 The weak public awareness is also imperative to understanding the production of 
asymmetric information in the GCC labor market. Although the Philippines offers pre-
departure orientation services (PDOS) to educate domestic workers about the legal, cultural, 
and social background of their respective destination country, our extensive discussions with 
sending country officials note that workers often do not utilize  existing destination countries’ 
laws and information.  Instead, domestic workers only visit the embassies if they face labor 
and employment problems or have to renew their passports or other travel documents. 
Similarly to the pre-departure services, the Philippines also offers a post arrival service at the 
destination countries to educate migrants in general and domestic workers in particular about 
their legal rights and implications in the current country. However, both of these services do 
not seem to be effective at closing the information gap. In fact, drawing from a 303 survey on 
runaway domestic workers in Qatar, more than 70% of Filipina domestic workers did not 
participate in the post-arrival orientation service. The orientation services are important 
mechanisms that allow the labor sending country to offer useful and crucial information, yet a 
limited number of recruitment agencies offer these provisions for its workers. Recruitment 
agencies directly transport domestic workers to their employers instead of giving them a post-
arrival orientation by the Philippines labor office in the destination country. The inadequate 
implementation of key government mechanisms to ameliorate the flow and availability of 
information, combined with limited public awareness of domestic workers, enable 
recruitment agencies to influence the flow of legal information. 
                                                 
9 In a similar finding, Fernandez (2013) studies the effects of the failure to regulate intermediaries of migration 
on employment of Ethiopian women as domestic workers in the Middle East.  
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As discussed above, various political, diplomatic, and legal environments influence 
the flow of information for domestic workers in both the origin and destination countries. We 
now focus on key actors in the Kafala sponsorship system that play a direct role in the 
quality, quantity and distribution of information to the domestic worker. We identify five 
main players: the recruitment agency, sponsor/employer, the origin countries’ governments, 
the destination countries’ governments, and social networks. We further examine how 
asymmetric information in the unregulated nature of domestic work sectors in the GCC 
generates micro-economic shocks to the migrant.  
Key Information Actors in the Kafala System  
Agency  
Recruitment agencies (including brokers and agents) in both sending and receiving countries 
play important roles in shaping information flow between labor markets. Under the Article 25 
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, ‘private recruitment agencies’ are referred to as “any 
individual, partnership, corporation or entity engaged in the recruitment and placement of 
persons for employment” (Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), 2013). 
Recruitment agencies therefore in both the sending (Philippines) and receiving (GCC) 
countries are both legally covered and regulated under the Philippines labor regulations. 
These recruitment agencies play central roles in the lives of migrant domestic workers within 
the UAE labor market. Agunias (2012) acknowledges: 
In the fierce competition to capture the coveted Middle East labor market, 
private recruitment agencies fulfill an important role – that of bridging the gap 
between employers or sponsors and prospective migrants. They recruit and 
guide migrants through the shoals of immigration policies and the difficulties 
of transit, match employers with workers and provide information about living 
and working conditions in distant locations. 
Yet such recruitment agencies are often associated with scrupulous practices that can place 
the worker in a vulnerable position.  As Abella (2004) contends, “the fee is not determined by 
the financial value of the good procured but by the demand itself… What the recruiter gets is 
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not a fee for the recruiter’s service but a ‘bribe’ to the job he or she offers.”  As one Filipina 
domestic worker in Kuwait, Conny, highlighted, “I paid US $700 to get this job. I saved and 
sold our lands so I can come here. I thought I would be able to save here and help my family 
more quickly. I was wrong. I have a lot of debts now, but I don’t know how to pay them 
when I go back home.” This sum of money (including unauthorized placement fees) is not 
part of the process but instead is imposed by recruiting agencies, which often put a heavy 
financial burden on migrant domestic workers. Prospective migrants are often unaware that 
these practices are illegal and should not affect their labor market prospect. Despite the UAE 
government’s strict regulations on unauthorized placement fees, private recruitment agencies 
have been able to continue to use their control over migrant domestic workers, often 
exercising direct threats to their status (i.e. immediate return or deportation, illegal salary 
deductions) or to the well-being of their families back home. One Filipina domestic worker in 
the UAE, Maria, acknowledged: “Our recruitment agency told us that we have no choice 
because, if we return to our country, we need to pay them US $4000 for the expenses paid by 
the employer.” To enforce restrictive control, the labor recruiter immediately locked the 
domestic workers for a few days and, instead, rehired them locally without government 
permission to recoup their previous recruitment costs.  This particular case forces migrant 
domestic workers to remain in their employment, despite their employer’s or agency’s 
ensuing labor contract violations. 
In addition, recruitment agencies both deliberately control the availability of 
information and lack the capacity or will to enforce labor standards. Agunias (2012) 
acknowledges “the onus for regulating the employer-employee relationship falls to 
recruitment agencies, which unfortunately are often ill equipped to effectively enforce labor 
standards”. As Jenny, a Filipina domestic worker in Qatar, noted: “I was offered $400 here, 
so I took this job. When I was in Manila, I worked in a factory job, making $220 a month, 
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and since I have 4 children, I thought this would help me a lot. But when I moved to Qatar, 
the agency told me not to even dare to ask for $400 because the average is only $250. I was 
upset but I cannot go back anymore.” Despite the explicit labor violation (i.e. illegal salary 
deduction), the recruitment agency failed to enforce the standard payment of $400 that is 
stipulated within the employment contract.10 Instead, the recruitment agency knowingly 
encouraged the migrant worker to continue working for only $200.  In this specific instance, 
the migrant’s earnings in the destination country were even lower than they were at the 
sending country. Further, labor recruiters often resort to threatening the families of the 
domestic workers to pay for deployment costs (i.e. visa, plane ticket fees). Tessa, a Filipina 
domestic worker who lives in Qatar, additionally complained: “When I returned to the office, 
my agent called my family and asked them to pay for my ticket and incomplete contract 
obligations.  They harassed my family, so they can force me to stay in the country and repay 
my debt.” In other words, recruitment agencies perpetuate information asymmetry and lack 
the will to enforce labor standards for migrant domestic workers.  
Sponsor 
Like recruitment agencies, sponsors play a vital role in maintaining the Kafala system. Halabi 
(2008) explains the imbalance of power between the sponsors and domestic workers within 
the Kafala system: 
In order for a migrant to work in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, she must first 
secure a visa through a method of sponsorship known as Kafala, which legally 
binds the worker to her employer. Although both the sponsor and worker are 
capable of breaking contract, this ostensible equality is merely a ruse, because 
if the worker breaks her contract, she must pay the cost of her return ticket (a 
charge that would have otherwise been paid by the sponsor). She may also be 
fined or forced to pay debts to the recruitment agency. Through this system of 
sponsorship, the fate of the migrant worker is entirely dependent upon the 
goodwill of an employer who, at any time, can threaten her deportation if 
                                                 
10On December 16, 2006, the Philippines government approved a series of resolutions to improve the quality of 
life of domestic workers abroad. Among other things, they included a minimum wage of $400 for Filipina 
domestic workers in all major labor-receiving countries, including the GCC countries (the Philippine Overseas 
Employment Administration’s (POEA), 2007).  
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unsatisfied. Once in host countries, migrants are required to surrender their 
passports to their employers. Thus, even before the worker steps foot in her 
host country, the systems of exploitation are already in place. 
Although domestic workers regularly obtain less than the contractually agreed salary, they 
are often compelled to stay for two years (the usual contract period) to compensate for 
incurred debt. After completion of the contract, they expect an easy transfer of employment 
to another employer. These factors influence them to stay in the host country and continue 
working to support any offspring back home. One Filipina domestic worker, Patricia in 
Qatar, noted: “I have a bachelor’s degree in business and I only took this job because I did 
not pay a placement fee. I was promised that I could become a business secretary after one 
year of employment. I realized later that I could not even get out of my contract, unless I get 
deported first. I had to stay because I have four children to support; who’s going to feed 
them?”  These particular narratives not only reinforce the recruitment agencies’ manipulative 
role in the recruitment process, but also reflect the foreseeable challenges faced by some 
employers in the destination country.11 
Domestic workers’ lack of legal and market knowledge often influence them to stay 
illegal and vulnerable in the destination market. Under the Ministry of Interior's (MOI's) 
administrative rules and regulations, domestic workers who complete their contracts have the 
right to stay for one month before departing to their home countries. This rule creates an 
opportunity for domestic workers to settle any financial dues or, in most cases, look for 
employment. However, given many domestic workers’ ignorance of this immigration rule, 
they often do not report to local respective authorities (i.e. Philippines Embassy, police 
stations) to verify their immigration status. Since domestic workers are often confined to their 
                                                 
11 Jureidini (2010) highlights the ability of agencies and employers to control migrant domestic workers as an 
important source for an environment of abuse and exploitation of domestic workers.  
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sponsors' homes, the role of the sponsors (employers) to disseminate such information is 
vital.12  
Illegal immigration status further creates legal and market vulnerabilities for domestic 
workers in the destination country. As our qualitative interviews verified, many domestic 
workers struggle to bargain for higher wages with employers because of their illegal 
immigration status. An illegal status has often put many domestic workers in a poor position, 
as they cannot defend their particular rights due to the absence of employment contracts 
signed by the UAE government. One Filipina domestic worker, Amparo, highlighted: “My 
employer gave me $200 for my salary, even though she initially promised $350.  She told me 
that she can easily find other illegal maids for much cheaper. I remained silent because I had 
no choice but to send money to my children.” Therefore, with long hours, unequal status, and 
little food, domestic workers like Amparo find it difficult to reinforce mutually agreed labor 
rights. Their lack of information and lack of knowledge of labor rights and options inherently 
lead to loss of income and further labor abuse throughout the process. 
Asymmetric information creates both legal and economic risks for migrants and 
additional complications for government officials. With no official employer/agency, the 
Philippines government has found it difficult to secure more protection for domestic workers. 
As one Filipino official, Marco in Qatar maintains, “When a domestic worker becomes 
illegal, it is more difficult to seek legal assistance for her.”  
Embassy 
Under the Philippines laws RA 8042 and RA 10002, the Philippines government is mandated 
to extend legal protection to all Filipino workers, particularly domestic workers. The 
Philippines government – indirectly represented by labor and welfare officers at Overseas 
Worker and Welfare Administration (OWWA) and the Philippines Office of Labor (POLO) – 
                                                 
12 A domestic worker employer may not necessarily be her sponsor although this seems to be the majority of the 
cases in our sample. For simplicity, we use both terms interchangeably.  
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works closely with domestic workers to address labor and employment related challenges, yet 
the Philippines government faces critical vulnerabilities, particularly in regards to illegal and 
absconding cases. In the case of Maria, the Philippines government struggled to protect her 
due to her prolonged illegal immigration status (Malit 2013). Runaway domestic workers 
could be offered some protection in case they report directly to the Philippines embassy after 
absconding. Another Filipina domestic worker, Trisha in Qatar, acknowledged: “I did not 
know that I have to report to the Philippines Embassy. If I had known, I would have been 
able to fix my problems and complain directly.” Her lack of information about the 
appropriate procedures for applying for second employment, combined with her 
misconception that if she seeks help from the embassy, she will be deported, further put her 
in a vulnerable position in the domestic work sector. 
As a result, domestic workers like Trisha, and Maria often fail to receive immediate 
and appropriate legal protection, as the Philippines government struggles to reclaim the 
workers' unpaid wages and force their agencies and employers to pay for their salaries or 
airline tickets. Although domestic workers have limited access to the MOI police officers, the 
MOI personnel are the only officials allowed to follow up with labor cases. Another Filipino 
labor official, Marco in Qatar, observed: “Once we submit the domestic worker to the police 
station, the host country's government normally facilitates the dialogues with the employer. 
We can only follow-up and check on the status of the case, but our influence is very limited 
due to their own legal jurisdiction.” Because of illegal immigration status, domestic workers 
have no formal employers, which places substantive powers in the hands of local government 
agencies. Thus, early deportation often becomes inevitable. 
Local Government  
Under the MOI of the host country, domestic workers are covered in both legal and 
administrative proceedings and cases. The MOI – indirectly represented by police and 
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immigration officers – plays an important role in ensuring full compliance of immigration 
rules and procedures in the host country.  One of the most challenging functions of the local 
government is to regulate and address domestic worker’s cases, particularly absconding ones. 
As one local official in the UAE, Mohammed notes: “We try to settle this case by calling 
their employers at home. It is hard to, because sometimes domestic workers run away even 
though they are paid the minimum wage of $400 and are treated respectfully.”13 Absconding 
constitutes a violation of immigration residency and rules. These cases have created direct 
pressure both on the MOI to immediately regulate these immigration rules and procedures 
and on the employers who therefore would have to protect their status/rights. When the 
employer’s reaction is to file early for missing domestic worker, the runaway worker 
automatically becomes illegal and, therefore, faces different labor market constraints. The 
new environment faced by the absconding worker often has serious impacts on the earning 
ability of that worker. 
Most domestic workers, for example, are often unaware or ignorant about the host-
country laws in this environment. The recruitment agencies often do not provide such legal 
awareness to domestic workers, creating an imbalance of information. As one Filipino 
official, Marcos in Qatar, acknowledges: “It is the duty of recruitment agencies to facilitate 
knowledge information for the domestic workers. We call these agencies all the time, but 
they often do not fully reveal the information to us. On the other hand, sometimes, maids do 
not tell all information – whether at fault or not –and this add to the difficulty in regulating 
and examining the domestic work sector.” Although the Philippines government has some 
programs to provide legal awareness, it does not broadly cover the labor laws and legal 
challenges to domestic workers, particularly the role of police officers in the host country. 
                                                 
13 In our sample, some domestic workers absconded for personal reasons such as getting pregnant.  
 20 
This puts domestic workers at risk, often making decisions that have potential dire 
consequences on income and employment. 
Social Networks 
Perhaps the most important source of information for migrants is social networks. Migrants’ 
social networks comprise relatives, friends, or acquaintances who have migration experience. 
These networks are divided into two geographical locations: those in the Philippines (pre-
departure) and those at the destination country (post-departure). There is no doubt that 
technological advances (mobile and smart phones, voice-over-internet protocol) and access to 
other domestic workers, through the proliferation of internet cafes, for instance, or even 
through direct access from the sponsor/employer, facilitate transfer of information across 
different networks and eventually to migrants.14 However, the information being transferred 
is often related to a specific migrant’s encounter with the law and, therefore, is not always 
applicable to others. In fact and in many instances, our qualitative interviews suggest that 
advice based on a personal and specific migrant’s story can be useless if not even harmful to 
domestic workers due to the rapidly changing legal and administrative policies on domestic 
workers in the Gulf countries.15 
 To summarize, domestic workers in the Gulf region can obtain information from five 
different sources located in both the sending and receiving countries: labor agencies (in both 
sending and receiving countries), sponsors in the destination country (employers), 




                                                 
14 See for instance Moors et al (2009).   
15 Friends, family members, and, in some cases, newly recruited government officers (both sending/receiving 
countries) provide conflicting recommendations on how to resolve domestic workers’ cases. These sources, in 















Figure 1 highlights the source of information available to the domestic worker in time of 
decision making. The decision making starts with the decision to migrate based on available 
information from labor agencies, government institutions, and social networks at the country 
of origin. Once at the destination country, faced with a different set of information and 
potentially harsh working conditions, domestic workers often contemplate to escape by 
absconding. One Filipina domestic worker in the UAE, Patricia, asserted: “My recruitment 
agent said once I finish my contract, he can easily take me into another job as a saleslady. 
But, instead, he forced me to work for another family after the two-year contract. I did not get 
my salary so I decided to find my own employer. I did not know exactly where the embassy 
is, so I left and moved in with friends.”  Instead of reporting to official institutions (whether 
the country’s embassy or the host country’s authorities), some runaway domestic workers 
often hide from the authorities, which obviously places them in a more vulnerable conditions. 
With limited information, domestic workers often become illegal and vulnerable migrant 
targets. Migrants’ new immigration status decreases their income potential and violates the 
immigration residency and rules in the process, including the current UAE 
residency/immigration law (Under the Federal Labor Law No. 8, domestic workers are not 
legally protected, including mediation and reconciliation). 
 22 
The decision to abscond could be a rational decision or a consequence of another 
decision, which is often the result of a lack of information. A rational, fully-informed migrant 
would weigh the expected value before deciding to quit his or her job since the decision to 
abscond has an inherent element of a gamble. On the positive side, an absconding migrant 
has more mobility and more freedom in the choice of work.16 On the negative side, a 
clandestine migrant has less bargaining power and is seen as an illegal, so he or she will 
potentially face jail time, deportation and eventually a ban.17 An employed domestic worker 
faces the following two outcomes after absconding: not get caught, and get caught with 
respective probabilities of occurring. Under each scenario, absconding domestic workers will 
face different expectations of earnings or payoffs. The expected earnings under the first 
scenario (absconding without getting caught) could be lower (due to the loss of bargaining 
power) or higher (due to the mobility and flexibility). If a domestic worker gets caught then 
the payoff becomes zero or even negative (daily fines for being illegal). A risk loving 
domestic worker would decide to abscond if the expected value is at least zero while a risk 
averse worker would only abscond if the expected value of the gamble (abscond) is greater 
than zero. If the expected value is negative then the domestic worker would decide to stay at 
her current job. The outcome of the expected value is heavily dependent on the amount of 





                                                 
16 Pessoa et al (2014) discusses market vulnerabilities among Ethiopian workers who moved to Qatar under a 
free visa system where the job associated with the visa does not exist, giving the worker freedom of the choice 
of work as long as he/she fulfilled the visa costs.   
17 Periodically, GCC countries offer amnesty towards illegal migrants. Amnesty offers typically occur around 
religious holidays (such as the Holy Month of Ramadan). The offer allows illegal workers to return back home 
without prosecution.    
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Policy Recommendations 
To summarize and regroup, the Kafala sponsorship system creates different levels of 
information that ultimately increase the labor market vulnerability of domestic workers. 
Domestic workers, for instance, frequently end up in work environments that do not match 
the stipulated original employment contract (in terms of salary, job description and work 
conditions). As a result, domestic workers choose to abscond in search for a better job 
opportunity. It is not clear how prevalent absconding in the Gulf region is since data is scarce 
but the recorded number of new absconding domestic workers in the UAE was more than 
14,000 in 2013 alone.18 Absconding domestic workers add costs to both, the host and sending 
country. The host country covers the daily cost of hundreds of absconding workers in several 
deportation centers while awaiting for their repatriation back home. Other absconding 
workers become illegal migrants and blend in the total workforce. Shah (2009) estimates that 
illegal migrants constituted around 15% of the total workforce in the Gulf region in the early 
2000s. For the labor sending countries, workers who abscond and lose their income earnings 
do not remit and eventually increase local unemployment after being repatriated. In other 
terms, both host and sending countries have the incentives to deal with information 
asymmetry. What should be done? 
1. Better policy coordination among labor sending and receiving countries, 
particularly in information dissemination on labor market regulations and 
immigration procedures. This could materialize through bilateral agreements, 
establishments of join labor migration committees and sharing of data. 
2. Better monitoring and inspection of recruitment practices. As seen from the 
abovementioned discussion, recruitment agencies do not only play a crucial role in 
                                                 
18 In its latest report, the General Directorate of Residency and Foreign Affairs (GDRFA) in Dubai announced 
that the number of absconding cases of domestic workers in 2013 was 14,150 (a little bit lower than 14,741 
recorded in 2012) (Sambidge, 2014). This number includes new absconding cases that have been reported by the 
employer/sponsor.    
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applying legal procedures in moving workers but also in disseminating the type, 
quality and level of information available to workers. GCC countries should strictly 
regulate and monitor recruitment agencies, possibly even considering centralizing 
recruitment efforts by opening and expanding state agencies in the labor sending 
countries.  At the same time, creating an updated online database of recruitment 
agencies that monitors the recruiting practices and offers agency rankings could help 
guide potential migrants to the better performing agencies.  In fact, rankings of the 
agencies would be based on feedback from domestic workers and would create the 
right incentives for recruitment agencies to improve their practices. 
3. Social networks also play substantial role in shaping domestic workers’ decision-
making patterns. These formal or information sources of networks directly reach 
domestic workers and therefore offer a unique opportunity to close the information 
gap. Labor receiving countries should create social media presence (similar to that of 
Dubai Police online social media accounts on different platforms) that directly 
interact with domestic workers and offer information and assistance. Labor sending 
countries should offer cheap smartphones to departing migrants so they could access 
social media on their phone. Both of these proposed steps would allow domestic 
workers to gain a wider scope of information, potentially reducing information gaps 
from employers and recruitment agencies for information. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper examines the influence of asymmetric information on the domestic worker’s 
income and employment status in the Gulf labor market. Using data from semi-structured 
qualitative interviews with domestic workers, government officials, and recruitment agencies 
we identify the following findings. First, under the Kafala sponsorship system the flow of 
information to the domestic worker is controlled by five key players: labor sending country, 
labor receiving country, recruitment agency, sponsor (employer) and the worker’s social 
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network. Second, the incoherent bilateral and legal cooperation between origin and 
destination, combined with limited coordination, facilitates asymmetric information in the 
GCC domestic labor market. Third, asymmetric information not only produces costly market 
failures but also creates legal vulnerabilities in the host-country labor market. The lack of 
legal immigration and residency rules, combined with limited knowledge of English and 
Arabic languages often put migrant domestic workers in a difficult position to challenge 
current labor practices. Fourth, recruitment agencies (both in the sending and receiving 
countries) play a significant and often deliberate role in facilitating a mismatch in 
information. These particular practices (i.e. illegal salary deduction, providing limited 
training or awareness for domestic workers) directly reduce migrant domestic workers’ 
income and incentivize them to breach the labor contract rules and regulations, which often 
results in the early return of migrant domestic workers to their countries of origins, despite 
their heavy financial losses (i.e. pre-departure fees). Fifth, given the aforementioned 
recruitment agencies’ role, sponsors often employ violent tactics (i.e. threatening to early 
deployment, filing absconding) to protect potential income losses and reduce legal risks with 
hiring domestic workers. These particular cases have become key causes of human rights 
abuses, but also considered to have been influenced by the recruitment agencies’ failure to 
inform sponsors’ about domestic workers’ profile. Finally, receiving (i.e. local police and 
immigration officers) and sending (welfare bureaucrats and or government officials) 
countries’ authorities often regulate domestic workers’ cases and complaints due to 
incoherent and unequal flow of information between sponsors, domestic workers, and 
government authorities. This does not only burden the receiving and sending country’s public 
resources, but also often deepens existing sociopolitical tensions, regarding legal/labor 
protection for domestic workers in the host country. These conclusions on asymmetric 
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information constitute costly market failures and place migrant domestic workers in a legally 
vulnerable condition in the host country.    
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